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IS LEGALITY POLITICAL?
FREDERICK SCHAUER*
INTRODUCTION
Following the law just because it is the law seems surprisingly
unpopular in the United States these days. Or maybe it is not just
“these days.” And perhaps this should not be surprising. For some
time now, political figures, public officials, and legions of commenta-
tors have treated the law—formal sanctions aside—as something to
be followed when it produces results perceived as desirable on first-
order policy or political grounds, but as something to be disregarded
or slighted when what the law demands differs from the course of
action that might otherwise have been pursued for law-independent
reasons. Quite often, it appears, officials and citizens alike condemn
the unlawful character of policies they oppose on substantive
grounds, but ignore any illegalities in the policies they favor. 
Examples of this phenomenon are ubiquitous. The Bush admin-
istration seemingly treated the law as an annoying yet ultimately
surmountable obstacle when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act1 interfered with what the administration believed was the
valuable or even necessary warrantless domestic surveillance of
American citizens,2 but much the same attitude toward the law was
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1. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 102, 92
Stat. 1783, 1787 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 50 U.S.C.).
2. Most attempts to litigate FISA violations have become embroiled in questions
regarding state secrets and related issues surrounding the confidentiality of national security
information. See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205-06 (9th
Cir. 2007); Ciralsky v. CIA, No. 1:10cv911 (LMB/JFA), 2010 WL 4724279, at *6 (E.D. Va. Nov.
15, 2010). But see In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
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embodied in the decisions by the mayors of New Paltz, New York,
and San Francisco, California, to marry same-sex couples in vio-
lation of the prevailing law in those states.3 President Bush’s
decision to invade Iraq was inconsistent with international law,4 but
little more or less so than President Clinton’s decision to authorize
military action in Kosovo.5 And numerous other instances of what
we might call “selective legality” pervade public and political life.6
Indeed, the debate over the appropriateness of referring to people
who have entered the United States in violation of existing law as
“illegal immigrants,” rather than as “undocumented workers,”
provides a nice example of the widespread tendency for people to
stress any illegality in the policies they disfavor while striving to
downplay it with respect to the policies they support.7 
1195-97 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (reaching the merits in finding a violation). For examples of the
widespread public commentary, see Editorial, Compromising the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2008, at A20; Editorial, Mr. Bush v. The Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2008, at
A20; Amy Schatz, Paul Camp, Liberals Unite on Spy Bill, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2008, at A16.
3. For descriptions, see Jennifer Medina, Charges Dropped Against Mayor Who
Performed Gay Weddings, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2005, at B5; Dean E. Murphy, California
Supreme Court Considers Gay Marriage Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A14. Those
who believe that this example involves morally defective law whereas the FISA case does not
should recall that the Bush administration perceived the necessity of defending the United
States against terrorism in undeniably urgent moral terms. See, e.g., Address Before a Joint
Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September
11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001) (describing fight against terrorism as a “great cause”
to defend “principles” of “freedom,” “justice,” “religious” freedom, “liberty,” “democra[cy],”
“pluralism,” and “tolerance” against “evil” and “repress[ion]”). That both same-sex marriage
and warrantless surveillance in the service of national security are defended on moral
grounds does not, of course, mean that such moral claims are necessarily correct. Making a
moral claim is not the same as making a sound moral claim. Still, the fact that many people
might evaluate the moral claims in the two instances differently is exactly the point, because
distinguishing the two cases on the soundness of the underlying moral claims would treat the
moral correctness of the decision, and not its legality or illegality, as the basis for criticism
or praise. 
4. See Philippe Sands, Lawless World? The Bush Administration and Iraq: Issues of
International Legality and Criminality, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 296 (2006).
5. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM
AFTER KOSOVO 34-35 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2090 n.186 (2005); Abraham
D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 2-3 (2000).
6. I discuss many of them in Frederick Schauer, Ambivalence About the Law, 49 ARIZ.
L. REV. 11, 11-16 (2007); Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain
Official Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 770-74 (2010).
7. See Which is Acceptable: “Undocumented” vs. “Illegal” Immigrant?, NPR (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122314131.
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As the examples in the previous paragraph were designed to
demonstrate, avoidance of the law in the service of what are per-
ceived to be sound political, policy, or moral goals appears at first
glance to have little political valence. Of course, these substan-
tive—or first-order—political, policy, and moral goals assuredly do
vary with time, place, political party, and presidential administra-
tion, but the willingness or unwillingness to subjugate the law to
those law-independent goals seems at times to be politically, tem-
porally, and geographically indiscriminate.8
It is thus a large and important question whether legality as
such—the fact of law just because it is the law, and not because of
the substantive content of the law—has any political incidence. Is
respect for the law because it is the law more the province of some
political orientations or parties than of others? In this Article, I
propose to examine this question, albeit more anecdotally than
systematically. But the anecdotes and the available data span a
wide variety of further questions: Do Congress or the executive
branch consider themselves bound by Supreme Court or lower court
judicial opinions with which they disagree? Do legislative bodies
follow the rules they have set forth for their own procedures? Do
federal, state, and local officials follow the law when they need not
worry about first-order public opinion or formal legal sanctions?
Much of popular “rule of law” rhetoric appears to assume that the
law both is and should be a significant constraint on the behavior of
nonjudicial public officials and policy-relevant public figures.9 But
a closer look at the evidence may suggest—albeit tentatively—that
the willingness to disregard inconvenient law is a common phenom-
enon, and that it exists across the political spectrum. To the extent
that this is so, it may indicate that acquiescence to the law more
broadly is similarly politically indiscriminate, such that for all of
the substantive changes that political or electoral transformations
may produce, changes in the attitude about the law qua law is
rarely among them, and has not been among them in the most
recent American political transformations.
8. Within the United States, at least.
9. See, e.g., Editorial, Even for Gov. Christie, This One’s a Stretch, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2011, at A24; Editorial, The Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at A20; Editorial, What
Rule of Law?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A22.
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I
In order to situate the inquiry, a fair amount of brush clearing
will be necessary. And the first swath of brush to be cleared is the
question of just what it is to obey or follow the law. What do we
mean when we say that a policymaker obeys the law, or that a
policy follows or complies with the law? Initially, it is important to
distinguish compliance from conformity, or consistency. That is, the
question whether an official follows or obeys a law because it is a law
is different from the question whether official action happens to be
consistent, for reasons other than the existence of the law, with
what the law demands.10 The same applies to following or obeying
a court decision. It is one thing for a lower court or public official or
political body to make a decision that is merely consistent or in
conformity with what the Supreme Court has decided. Consider
California Proposition 209,11 for example, a state political decision
that happened to prohibit the same types of preferential use of race
in public employment, public education, or public contracting that
the then-prevailing and most applicable Supreme Court decision,
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,12 also prohibited.13
10. The distinction is common in the jurisprudential literature. Prominent analyses
include Joseph Raz, The Obligation To Obey: Revision and Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 139, 154-55 (1984); Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections
on Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 996-97 (1989); Donald H. Regan,
Reasons, Authority, and the Meaning of “Obey”: Further Reflections on Raz and Obedience to
Law, 3 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 15-16 (1990).
11. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. It is relevant to the overarching theme of this Article to ask
whether, if at all, faculty and staff at California public institutions of higher education treat
this provision—this law—as something to be followed, or instead as something to be
surreptitiously avoided. If, as I libelously suspect but cannot firmly document, there are at
least some such faculty and staff who treat the law in this case as other than something to be
obeyed, it would support the larger thesis of this Article. If there are such people, and if their
actions are plausibly in support of what they believe to be law-independent moral necessity,
their actions are not necessarily to be condemned. Obedience to law as law, regardless of the
moral consequences, is by no means always to be valued. And if this is so, and I believe it to
be so, then we need to be clearer than we have been about when and why disobeying the law
is itself subject to condemnation without reference to the substantive aims of the particular
disobedience. 
12. 438 U.S. 265, 319-20 (1978).
13. Proposition 209 went further of course, in prohibiting any preferential use of race,
rather than just the numerical quotas or separate applicant pools prohibited by Bakke and
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Proposition 209 was thus coincidentally consistent with the gov-
erning Supreme Court decision, but that is in contrast to a decision
made by a public body just because of a court decision, as when the
University of Michigan altered the way in which it took race into
account in undergraduate admissions solely because of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gratz v. Bollinger.14 Only in the latter case can
we say that the state has obeyed the Supreme Court, or complied
with it, because only in the latter case did the state act the way it
did just because of what the Supreme Court had decided.
Thus, it is important to exclude from the category of obedience
those actions that are consistent or in conformity with the law but
which are not taken because of the law.15 I do not, for example, kill
then by Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003). Compare CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31, with
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289. But the distinction between what the Supreme Court prohibited and
California’s broader prohibitions is not pertinent to the precise point under discussion, which
is that California’s prohibition on quotas and separate applicant pools was consistent with
Bakke, but not necessarily motivated by a desire to comply with Bakke.
14. 539 U.S. at 275-76. On the University of Michigan’s modification of its undergraduate
admissions policies because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gratz, see Press Release, Univ.
of Mich., New U-M Undergraduate Admissions Process To Involve More Information,
Individualized Review (Aug. 28, 2003), available at http://ns.umich.edu/index.html?Releases/
2003/Aug03/admissions.
15. An interesting and important recent example comes from President Obama’s letter
to Congress reporting on American military involvement in Libya. Press Release, White
House, Letter from the President Regarding the Commencement of Operations in Libya to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Mar.
21, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2011/03/21/letter-
president-regarding -commencement-operations-libya. In that letter, the President said that
he was providing the report “consistent with the War Powers Resolution.” Id. Given that the
President had not complied with the Resolution’s requirement that there be advance
consultation “in every possible instance,” War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1542
(2006), and given the persistent insistence of Presidents on the existence of broad commander-
in-chief powers that are unaffected by the Resolution, see Memorandum Opinion for the
Deputy Counsel to the President on the President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct
Military Operation Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001),
available at http://www.justice. gov/olc/warpowers925.htm, it is not surprising that President
Obama noted the consistency of his actions with parts of the Resolution without
acknowledging any obligation to comply with those parts that he may believe trench on his
constitutional powers. 
As this Article was going to press, the legal issues regarding American military operations
in Libya sharpened in ways that provide confirmation for some of the Article’s main themes.
As it became clearer that Congress was unwilling to provide explicit authorization for the
Libyan actions within the time constraints of the War Powers Resolution, the administration
sent a 32-page report on “United States Activities in Libya” to Speaker of the House John A.
Boehner on June 15, 2011. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE & U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
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or otherwise physically attack those of my colleagues who speak at
interminable length at faculty meetings, however tempting it might
be, but that is not because murdering or assaulting my colleagues
happens to be against the law. Rather, I refrain from such actions
because I believe them to be morally wrong and personally risky,
and those reasons would be sufficient to determine my nonmurder
and nonassault even absent the law. Similarly, my unwillingness to
eat human flesh is not a function of the laws against cannibalism.
It is simply that I find the prospect of such behavior repulsive—or
perhaps it is better to say “distasteful.” Were the laws against
cannibalism to be repealed,16 my culinary habits would not change
one whit. And thus with respect to these and countless other
examples, the law, designed primarily in such instances to control
the behavior of outliers to otherwise accepted social norms,17 is
UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA (2011) [hereinafter UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA],
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/06/16/us/politics/20110616_POWERS
_DOC.html?ref=politics. In that document, and in subsequent hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, the administration took two positions. One was that the
President had the constitutional authority without congressional approval to initiate the
military action in Libya. Id. at 25. In taking this position, the President aligned himself with
all of the incumbents of his office since the passage of the War Powers Resolution, implicitly
claiming that the Resolution was unconstitutional insofar as it would limit the President’s
powers under Article II. The second position, and the one that attracted much more attention,
was the claim that the Resolution was not in any event triggered because the military action
did not amount to “hostilities.” Id.; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office
of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV.
F. 62, 62 (2011), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/vol124_forum_morrison.pdf. In
taking what appears to me and others, Morrison, supra, at 62; Bruce Ackerman, Op-Ed., Legal
Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at A27, to be a highly implausible legal
position, and one that had been rejected by the Office of Legal Counsel, Morrison, supra, at
65, the administration thus appeared to confirm the view that an unwillingness to take
seriously the constraints of the law knows no politics and knows no party, especially in the
area of war and foreign policy. And although the dominance of issues relating to spending and
the national debt during the relevant time is an obscuring variable, the relative invisibility
of the legal issues lends some support to the view that the law qua law has very little political
salience.
16. Although cannibalism is widely abhorred, its illegality is more complex. The laws
against murder deal with most cases of cannibalism without the necessity of specific
prohibition. But some specific prohibitions address conduct that falls outside the scope of
murder laws, such as consuming an already-deceased human being. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-17-312 (West 2010) (prohibiting indecently disposing of a dead body).
17. Sometimes legal rules are designed, as with these examples, to protect prevalent social
norms against outliers. At other times, however, legal rules are enacted in order to change
those norms, as we see, for example, with respect to the laws dealing with the environment
and protection of endangered species. See Holly Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The
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entirely consistent with my first-order moral and personal prefer-
ences. The fact that the law happens to be aligned with those
preferences makes no difference at all to my behavior. But if, on the
other hand, we are interested in what the law does, and in how
officials perceive the law and act with respect to it, then we should
be interested, at least in part, in the extent to which the law
actually influences official behavior. For that purpose, the existence
of coincidentally conforming or compatible official behavior turns
out to be largely beside the point.
Thus, to revert to an earlier example, even if we believe that a
Clinton or an Obama administration would not have invaded Iraq
in 2003, and assuming all other events—including September 11,
2001—remained the same, we still should want to know the reasons
for the presumed difference. More particularly, we should ask
whether a different President or administrative course of action
would have been based on some aspect of domestic or international
law, or instead simply have been based on the moral, political, and
foreign policy differences between the Clinton and Obama adminis-
trations and those of the Bush administration. Similarly, even if we
assume that neither President George H.W. Bush nor President
Clinton would have authorized illegal18 aid to the Nicaraguan
Contras in 1986, we should want to know whether that position
would have been, for them, based on moral, political, and foreign
policy considerations on the one hand, or on legal considerations on
the other. If the moral, political, and foreign policy views of those
administrations would have been sufficient to produce a refusal to
provide military aid to the Contras, and thus a policy different for
nonlegal reasons from the policies undertaken during the Reagan
Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 90-92 (1999). Here and elsewhere the
law undoubtedly has the purpose of changing social norms rather than just enforcing
compliance against outliers to existing social norms. Much the same might be said about
many laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation, although
again the causal contribution of the law, as opposed to that of other cultural and political
factors and forces, is an empirical question rather than a self-evident axiom. 
18. The aid was illegal under the Boland Amendments of 1982 to 1984. Continuing
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1935
(1984); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2907, 98 Stat. 494, 1210; Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982); H.R.
REP. NO. 98-122, pt. 1, at 11 (1983).
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administration, then once again it may be that the law’s constraints
were for the most part causally inconsequential.
It  is  thus of considerable interest whether the existence of law,
as law, and just because it is law, provides content-independent
reasons, sanctions aside, for public officials to take the actions that
the law demands.19 Still, the reasons that may at times be provided
by law qua law are not necessarily conclusive reasons. So although
it is a mistake to conflate legal conformity with legal compliance, so
too is it a mistake to assume that legal nonconformity is necessarily
a product of the law being viewed as irrelevant. The law can provide
a reason for making a decision consistent with the law even if and
when that reason is outweighed or overridden by other reasons
inclining a decision in the opposite direction.20 That the Supreme
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger held some forms and some degree of
race-based affirmative action to be constitutional in the context of
higher education does not mean that the norm against taking race
into account—a norm emerging from previous cases and encapsu-
lated in the “strict scrutiny” and “compelling interest” standards21—
was not operative for even those Justices who agreed with the
outcome in Grutter.22 One reason can be outweighed by another and
19. On the content-independent nature of authority in general, and legal authority in
particular, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 35-37 (1986); H.L.A. Hart, Commands
and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
POLITICAL THEORY 243, 253-55 (1982); Kenneth Einar Himma, H.L.A. Hart and the Practical
Difference Thesis, 6 LEGAL THEORY 1, 2-3 (2000); Gerald J. Postema, The Normativity of Law,
in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 81, 86-87
(Ruth Gavison ed., 1987); Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382, 389-90 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002). For a challenge to the conventional wisdom about content-independence, see George
Klosko, Are Political Obligations Content Independent?, 39 POL. THEORY 498 (2011); P.
Markwick, Independent of Content, 9 LEGAL THEORY 43, 61 (2003).
20. On the distinction between the existence of reasons—or rights, or rules, or
duties—and the degree of their stringency, see, for example, FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND
IN LIFE 113-15 (1991); Robert Nozick, Moral Complications and Moral Structures, 13 NAT. L.F.
1, 1-42 (1968); Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415,
430-34 (1993); John Searle, Prima Facie Obligations, in PRACTICAL REASONING 81, 81-90
(Joseph Raz ed., 1978); Judith Jarvis Thomson, Some Ruminations on Rights, 19 ARIZ. L. REV.
45, 45-53 (1977).
21. 539 U.S. 306, 346 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995) (adopting strict scrutiny for race-based affirmative action
programs); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 469, 505 (1989) (same).
22. This is entirely a conceptual point, and I make no claims about what any of the
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still be a reason. Thus, as a conceptual matter, the existence of a
reason to follow the law just because it is the law is consistent with
that reason’s being outweighed in a particular case by other
reasons, such as morality, policy, or political prudence.
That said, however, if the very fact of law actually provides a
reason for some actor, set of actors, or institution to decide in ac-
cordance with the law, then over the long term, and for a large
enough array of decisions, we can expect the law to be dispositive in
some number of those decisions. This is an empirical and not a
conceptual point, but it should hardly be a controversial one. It
would indeed be surprising if a reason that was actually operative
as a reason for some actor or institution never, over a large and long
enough series of decisions, actually determined an outcome. Thus
a useful, even if not necessary, method for locating instances of
actual legal compliance is to attempt to identify those official de-
cisions that appear to reach conclusions other than the conclusions
that some official or institution would have reached had the law
been otherwise, or had the law simply not been pertinent to the
decision. Accordingly, with respect to the question of whether the
law qua law matters more to some Presidents than to others, or
more to some administrations than to others, or more to some polit-
ical parties than to others, one useful indicator of the extent to
which Presidents and their administrations genuinely take the law
seriously is to see when, if ever, those administrations make de-
cisions because of the law, and especially because of the law itself
and not because of any sanctions that may attach to violation of it.
And the way to isolate those decisions is to look for decisions that
are different than the ones that the same Presidents, administra-
tions, or parties would have made absent the law. 
Justices might believe or what they might do in other cases. Indeed, I make no claims about
the extent to which, if at all, nonabsolute constitutional rules and principles actually make
a difference in the Supreme Court. Still, the fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor subscribed to the strict scrutiny approach in Adarand and Croson but were also in
the majority in Grutter demonstrates the conceptual possibility of agreeing that there could
be both a strong reason militating against race-based affirmative action and an even stronger
reason in favor of such affirmative action in a particular case. 
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II
Although there are numerous dimensions of official obedience to
the law, a particularly salient one, albeit a highly controversial one
as well, is the question of official obedience to court decisions—in
particular, Supreme Court decisions—interpreting the Constitution.
As is well-known, the issue is controversial because of the hotly
debated question of the authority of such decisions in the first
place.23 The so-called judicial supremacists, including myself,24 as
well as most of the Justices of the Supreme Court,25 take Supreme
Court interpretations of the Constitution to be strongly—which is
not the same as absolutely26—authoritative. For judicial suprema-
cists, Supreme Court decisions can of course be criticized as poor
interpretations of the Constitution. But those decisions nevertheless
have the status of law and should be obeyed, at least presumptively
albeit not conclusively, by officials purporting to profess an obliga-
tion to obey the law and the Constitution.27 The Constitution may
not be what the Supreme Court says it is28 for purposes of external
23. A useful overview is Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as
Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 43-45 (1993).
24. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply,
17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 480-82 (2001); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1387 (1997); Frederick
Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1046
(2004).
25. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003); Bd. of Trs. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000); City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
26. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
27. See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron
Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 403-12 (1982); Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of
Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. REV. 991, 993 (1987); Frederick Schauer, The Questions
of Authority, 81 GEO. L.J. 95, 106-10 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, Justice O’Connor’s Dilemma:
The Baseline Question, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 865, 903-05 (1998); Larry Alexander &
Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1594, 1640 (2005)
(reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)); Michel Rosenfeld, Comment, Executive Authority, Judicial Authority
and the Rule of Law: Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of
Powers, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 137, 138-42 (1993).
28. “We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is.”
Justice Charles Evans Hughes, Speech at Elmira, New York (May 3, 1907), in JOHN
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 700 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980).
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critique of what the Supreme Court has done,29 but for the judicial
supremacist, the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is
for purposes of establishing the constitutional obligations of lower
courts30 and members of the legislative and executive branches of
government.
In recent years, judicial supremacy has been challenged in two
different but related ways. The more venerable challenge, dating at
least as far back as Abraham Lincoln’s denial that the Dred Scott
decision31 was binding on the President,32 is what these days goes
by the name of “departmentalism.”33 For the departmentalist, the
Supreme Court has the power to make constitutional determina-
tions for its own purposes, including the purpose of entertaining
challenges to the constitutionality of legislation.34 But the Supreme
Court’s authority to make constitutional determinations for its pur-
poses is no greater than the authority of Congress and the President
to make constitutional determinations for their purposes.35 Except
with respect to orders in particular cases, therefore, the depart-
mentalist rejects the notion that Supreme Court interpretations of
29. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 85-91, 124-54 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph
Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994) (arguing that having an internal point of view with respect to the law
entails and explains criticism of legal outcomes for departing from the law).
30. On the substantially less controversial view that lower courts should follow even those
decisions of higher courts with which they disagree, see Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and
Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1, 6-8 (1994). The issue is treated extensively, and with more sympathy to judges who might
disregard what others see as “the law,” in JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF LEGALITY: THE
ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING 8-15 (2010); Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey
Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 821-23 (1994).
31. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
32. Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas (Oct. 13, 1858), in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 255 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); Abraham
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, supra, at 262, 268.
33. See Keith E. Whittington, James Madison Has Left the Building, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
1137, 1148 (2005) (reviewing J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN
CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004)).
34. And thus a challenge to judicial interpretive supremacy need not constitute a
challenge to judicial review in general or to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803), in particular.
35. See John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting
the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 372-73 (1988).
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the Constitution are authoritative for the other branches of
government.36
Departmentalism should be distinguished from the closely related
popular constitutionalism, which sees public decision making and
the process of public deliberation as the ultimate determinant of
constitutional meaning, the Supreme Court’s views notwithstand-
ing.37 For popular constitutionalists, the Constitution is in impor-
tant ways different from ordinary law. Consequently, the people, in
public deliberation and in the expressions of their culture and poli-
tical activity, have a substantial role to play in determining what
the Constitution means, not only ultimately but even in the short
and intermediate term.38
These debates about the locus of constitutional interpretive
authority are important and ongoing, and I describe them briefly
36. For prominent expositions of departmentalism, albeit with some variations among
them, see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-53 (1988); Franklin Roosevelt, Draft
Speech on the Gold Clause Cases (Feb. 19, 1935), in F.D.R.: HIS PERSONAL LETTERS 1928-
1945, at 459-60 (Elliot Roosevelt ed., 1950); Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity
and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 106 (1998); Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and
Nonjudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359, 392-94 (1997);
Edward Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 123, 156-
58 (1999); Gary Lawson & Christopher Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1329-30 (1996); Edwin Meese III, The Law of the
Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985 (1987); Robert F. Nagel, Name-Calling and the Clear
Error Rule, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 193, 210-11 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994);
Bruce G. Peabody, Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and
a New Agenda for Research, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 63, 67-69 (1999); Saikrishna Prakash &
John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1542-43 (2005); Keith E.
Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80
N.C. L. REV. 773, 845-46 (2002).
37. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004); Robert C. Post, Foreword, Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 110-12 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1950 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People, Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 25-26 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution].
Although taking on a more capacious agenda, there is also somewhat of the flavor of popular
constitutionalism in MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194
(1999). Outside of the United States context, the same could be said of RAN HIRSCHL,
TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM
211-17 (2004).
38. See Larry D. Kramer, Foreword, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 164-65 (2001).
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here to emphasize that associating obedience to the Constitution
with obedience to judicial interpretations of the Constitution is a
highly contested position. Nevertheless, at least one form of obedi-
ence to law is obedience to what courts, including courts operating
as constitutional interpreters, have announced the law to be. So
although obedience to judicial judgments and opinions may be a
less important form of obedience to law for some observers than it
is for others, this form of obedience can still provide a useful way of
approaching the question of whether obedience to the law, as
clarified in the foregoing section, is an attitude or a set of behaviors
that can be said to have a political valence.
III
Although I have just been using the debates among judicial
supremacists, departmentalists, and popular constitutionalists for
purposes of clarification, those debates are a useful entry into the
main theme of this Article. More precisely, we can ask whether
there is a politics of judicial supremacy, and whether the position
that judicial interpretations of the Constitution need not be con-
sidered binding is one that varies with political party or political
orientation.
If we were to look at this question based on history, it would be
hard to identify very much political incidence for positions in the
vicinity of departmentalism. In the modern debates, department-
alism is often associated with Attorney General Edwin Meese’s
speech at Tulane University,39 which sparked much of the contem-
porary interest in the subject.40 And it is plausible to suppose that
at least one motivation for Meese’s position was a desire to free the
nation from excess—in his view, and in the view of the Reagan
administration generally—deference to the Supreme Court’s abor-
tion and school prayer decisions.41 Still, Attorney General Meese’s
39. Meese, supra note 36, at 979 (annotated reprint of October 21, 1986, speech at Tulane
University).
40. For some of the contemporaneous debate, see Symposium, Perspectives on the
Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985-88 (1987).
41. See Meese, supra note 36, at 988. In a subsequent clarification (or, some might say,
retreat), Meese emphasized that he was not saying that Supreme Court decisions should be
entitled to no deference. But he did emphasize his view that Supreme Court decisions could
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rejection of judicial constitutional interpretive supremacy received
some endorsement, even from those with few, if any, political sym-
pathies with Meese in particular or with the Reagan administration
in general.42 Moreover, there is a remarkable compatibility, as
Meese himself noted at the time,43 between his position and that
espoused by Abraham Lincoln.44 And Franklin Roosevelt’s view
about what Congress should do in the face of what he and a majority
of Congress believed to be unfortunate Supreme Court precedent
also occupied similar conceptual space,45 although Roosevelt’s
politics, especially when understood in the New Deal context, were
hardly those of Meese half a century later.
One explanation for the political diversity of what we might
call the Lincoln-Roosevelt-Meese-Levinson-Paulsen46 view is some
amount of agreement, even in the face of political differences, about
fundamental propositions of political theory, including propositions
about the respective roles of the courts, the legislature, and the
executive in a system of separation of powers. Another explanation
might be that at least for some departmentalists, even if not for all
of them, departmentalism is not a first-order political value, but is
instead instrumental to other values, especially first-order sub-
stantive values of morality and policy. Insofar as that is the case,
there would be nothing disingenuous in a theorist or political figure
choosing to be a departmentalist precisely because departmen-
talism was perceived to be the position most conducive to the de-
sirable first-order political or policy or moral goals. So if someone
believed—as many people did believe in 1986—that restrictions on
abortion and the permissibility of prayer in the public schools were
desirable first-order political and policy and moral positions based
on even deeper political and policy and moral principles, and
believed as well that those ends were more likely to be achieved in
be viewed as narrow holdings rather than as broad statements of what the law is. Edwin
Meese, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1003, 1003, 1004, 1006 (1987). On
Meese’s substantive disagreement with Roe v. Wade, see id. at 1004.
42. E.g., Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071, 1078
(1987).
43. Meese, supra note 36, at 984-87.
44. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
45. Roosevelt, supra note 36, at 459.
46. Paulsen, supra note 36, at 221, was for some years the most extended academic
defense of departmentalism, at least among those who might loosely be called “conservatives.”
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state legislatures, in Congress, and in the executive department
than in the federal courts, one could advocate departmentalism for
a principled reason, albeit a principle relating to these first order
positions and not a principle about departmentalism itself.47 Thus,
we might hypothesize that Lincoln, Roosevelt, and the Reagan
Department of Justice all believed in their first-order substantive
values—antislavery, the New Deal, and the so-called Reagan
Revolution, respectively—to oversimplify the issue dramatically—
and were opportunist departmentalists, advocating department-
alism as a strategy for maximizing the likelihood of acceptance of
their first-order political or moral or policy positions. Insofar as this
speculation is true, and more importantly, insofar as it is represen-
tative, then the diverse politics of departmentalism would lend some
credibility to the claim that there are no politics of obedience to the
Supreme Court, but only the politics of the underlying positions that
obedience or disobedience to Supreme Court decisions might or
might not facilitate.48
These days we might reach similar conclusions about the complex
politics of popular constitutionalism.49 The leading academic advo-
cates of popular constitutionalism, Deans Kramer and Post most
prominently,50 are commonly associated with liberal or progressive
or left-of-center or Democratic politics, but perhaps the leading
nonacademic advocates of popular constitutionalism these days are
the members of the Tea Party movement.51 In making constant
reference to their view of the Constitution, in wrapping an entire
political movement in the language and the iconography of the
Constitution, and in relying heavily on their reading of the history
and purpose of the Constitution, the leaders of the Tea Party
movement can be said to be advancing the view, not too far removed
from Kramer’s, that constitutional meaning—and perhaps also
47. For an extended version of this argument, see Frederick Schauer, Neutrality and
Judicial Review, 22 L. & PHIL. 217, 231-35 (2003).
48. See Post & Siegel, Protecting the Constitution, supra note 37, at 25-26.
49. See id.
50. See supra notes 37-38; see also Larry D. Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1343, 1343 (2005). And for a response, see Lawrence G. Sager, Courting
Disaster, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1361, 1361 (2005).
51. For a discussion of the popular constitutionalism of the Tea Party movement, see
Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Contradictions of Popular Originalism,
53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827 (2011). 
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constitutional interpretive methodology—should be determined not
by the Supreme Court, and certainly not by what past Supreme
Courts have done, but in public and popular debate by the people
now.52
It may well be that either Dean Kramer or the Tea Party
Movement is mistaken about the substantive consequences of
popular constitutionalism. That is, one or the other may be mis-
taken about the principles and interpretations the people may in
fact select in engaging in the popular constitutionalist enterprise.
Or it may be that both hold similar and principled positions about
the value of public determinations of constitutional meaning,
independent of the particular meaning that might be chosen. But it
is nevertheless clear that popular constitutionalism has produced
and is now producing some strange bedfellows, a phenomenon that
again might lend some support to the view that positions about the
degree of deference to the courts may be substantially a function of
first-order substantive preferences, and not necessarily about
whether the deference or nondeference has an intrinsic political
orientation.53
IV
In examining the politics of legality, we can also look more closely
at the behavior of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the branch of
the Department of Justice charged with providing legal advice to the
President specifically and the executive branch of government more
generally.54 OLC provides its advice in many different public and
not-so-public ways, but because many of its opinions and policy
statements are publicly available, these public documents provide
a useful window through which we can examine the question of
official attitudes toward the law.
52. Id. at 1-4.
53. For a discussion of the politics of popular constitutionalism, and the strategic
implications that follow from those politics, see Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism’s
Hard When You’re Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to Courts, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
367 (2008).
54. Office of Legal Counsel: About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.
gov/olc/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
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One of the things that OLC opinions reveal is that depart-
mentalism may exist more as a public presidential or political
position than as a genuine operating principle in any administra-
tion. It turns out, for example, that in the twenty-five years since
Attorney General Meese’s prominent speech,55 only one OLC legal
opinion has actually taken the strong departmentalist position that
a more-or-less on point Supreme Court need not be followed by the
other branches of government.56 That 1992 opinion, albeit with a bit
of hedging about holding and dicta,57 dealt with the question of the
ratification of what is now the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution,58 which was originally introduced 200 years earlier as
the (then) Second Amendment, prohibiting members of Congress
from raising their own salaries in the absence of an intervening
election.59 Because of the length of time between the original
passage by Congress and the ratification by the thirty-eighth state,
Michigan, in May of 1992, the question arose as to whether the
amendment had become part of the Constitution as a result of
Michigan’s action. Explicitly rejecting plainly applicable language
55. See Meese, supra note 36 (annotated reprint of October 21, 1986, speech at Tulane
University).
56. Memorandum from Timothy E. Flanigan, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Counsel to the
President (May 13, 1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/congress.17.htm.
57. Some of us are inclined to think that almost all of the distinction between holding and
dicta is hedging. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL REASONING 54-57, 180-84 (2009). But the degree of hedging in the 1992 OLC opinion
would likely seem as such even to those who believe there is more to be said for the holding-
dicta distinction.
58. Memorandum from Timothy G. Flanigan, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Counsel to the
President, supra note 56.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. The amendment actually refers to “varying” the
compensation of senators and representatives, but typically there is less likelihood that
members of Congress will be inclined to lower their own salaries. Still, a recent event,
germane to the general theme of this Article, raises precisely this issue. When Senator
Barbara Boxer of California proposed that the salaries of Congress and the President be
suspended during a possible budget-impasse-inspired governmental shutdown, Senator
Patrick Leahy pointed out that such an action would violate both the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment with respect to Congress and Article II, Section 1 with respect to the President.
Senator Boxer took the position that the action would not be unconstitutional until and unless
it was challenged in court, and no senator joined in Senator Leahy’s textually impeccable
objection. For a description of the event, see Josiah Ryan, Dem Senator Slams Dem
Colleague’s Measure as Unconstitutional, THE HILL’S FLOOR ACTION BLOG (Mar. 1, 2011, 7:03
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/146859-dem-senator-slams-dem-colleagues-
measure-as-unconstitutional.
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in a 1921 Supreme Court decision,60 OLC offered the opinion that
the amendment had become part of the Constitution as a result of
Michigan’s action,61 an opinion that was ultimately, even if only
implicitly, accepted by both the President and Congress. 
Neither this opinion nor the Twenty-Seventh Amendment itself
are of major importance these days,62 but the fact that no other OLC
opinion appears to adopt a strong departmentalist position may say
something about the legal—as opposed to political and rhetori-
cal—importance of departmentalism. And if it is true that depart-
mentalism in its most explicit form emerges only episodically, and
almost never as an official executive branch position, this may tell
us something about the extent to which departmentalism and its
associated respect for applicable Supreme Court opinions varies
with political party.
Some support for this conclusion is provided by the extensive and
impressive research carried out on OLC opinions by Professor
Trevor Morrison.63 Morrison is concerned less with the effect of
Supreme Court judgments on OLC opinions than with the stare
decisis effect of OLC opinions on subsequent OLC opinions.64 But
through his examination of 1191 OLC opinions issued over the
course of thirty-three years (from the beginning of the Carter
administration) and six administrations (Carter, Reagan, Bush,
Clinton, Bush, and Obama), he reached the conclusion that the
OLC’s willingness to follow its own previous opinions varied from
administration to administration, but—importantly for my purposes
—did not vary in a statistically significant way between Democratic
and Republican administrations.65 Insofar as we take stare decisis
60. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921).
61. Memorandum from Timothy E. Flanigan, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Counsel to the
President, supra note 56.
62. The fact that the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was originally the Second—the original
First Amendment, dealing with congressional terms, has never been ratified by even close to
the requisite number of states—is, however, a useful bit of trivia for challenging the view,
particularly popular among journalists, that the First Amendment is especially important just
because it is the First Amendment. See Donnis Boggett, Op-Ed., The First Amendment is First
for a Reason, HAYS FREE PRESS (Kyle, Tex.), July 6, 2011, http://haysfreepress.com/archives/
21177.
63. Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1448, 1484 tbls.3 & 4 (2010).
64. Id. at 1455.
65. Id. at 1484 tbl.3.
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itself as a form of legality, and thus the willingness to accord stare
decisis effect to previous opinions as a measure of adherence to
legality for its own sake, Morrison’s data lend support to the view
that legality itself may have little political incidence, a view further
supported by the inference we might draw from the almost complete
absence of OLC opinions, regardless of the party of the administra-
tion, directly challenging the authority of applicable Supreme Court
rulings.66
Of further note in this regard is an article published by Dawn
Johnsen during the time that her ultimately withdrawn nomination
to be the Director of the Office of Legal Counsel was pending.67
Although Johnsen was harsh in her criticisms of what she perceived
as Bush administration abuses of its powers, she was clear in her
view that, “in many circumstances, Presidents may develop, declare,
and act upon distinctive, principled constitutional views that do not
track those of the Supreme Court or Congress.”68 She also empha-
sized that, to her, the actions of Presidents Lincoln, Roosevelt, and
Reagan, among others, in contradiction of existing judicial interpre-
tations, were within the proper scope of presidential interpretive
authority.69 Johnsen’s views should not necessarily be taken as
either definitive or representative, but it is telling that on the basic
question of whether a President must accede to a judicial inter-
pretation to a judicial interpretation with which he disagrees—as a
question of interpretation and not of obedience to a particular
order—she appears to side, in the abstract and without regard to
particular applications, with the basic departmentalist position
commonly associated with Lincoln, Roosevelt, Meese, and many
others.70
66. See supra text accompanying note 56.
67. Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President To Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake
of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395 (2008).
68. Id. at 399. 
69. Id. at 408-09.
70. The most recent OLC “Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions”
Memorandum, dated July 16, 2010, is (presumably intentionally) ambiguous on the point,
stating that OLC analysis “should focus on traditional sources of constitutional meaning,
including the text of the Constitution, the historical record illuminating the text’s meaning,
the Constitution’s structure and purpose, and judicial and Executive Branch precedents
interpreting relevant constitutional provisions.” Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting
Assistant Attorney Gen., to Attorneys of the Office (July 16, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/
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V
Of course it is important not to ignore matters of degree. And
many matters of degree have arisen in the context of the so-called
signing statements that Presidents have long used to signal
constitutional objections, and thus potential nonenforcement, to
bills they will nevertheless sign and thus allow to become law.71 
Signing statements became widely discussed during the adminis-
tration of George W. Bush. Some of the initial reaction of outrage
from some journalists and political opponents of the President was
tempered by the view, coming even from some who disagreed with
the President on most policy matters, that such actions—exercises
of presidential interpretive independence—were neither unique to
this presidency nor necessarily to be condemned as a general
method of operation.72 Indeed, the data indicate that President
George H.W. Bush issued 174 signing statements in four years,
President Clinton 388 signing statements in eight years, President
George W. Bush 163 in eight years, and President Obama eighteen
in slightly over two years.73 These data may of course be highly mis-
leading. They ignore the scope of a signing statement; one signing
statement may in fact challenge a larger or smaller number of
olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf.
71. See William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 IND. L.J. 303, 319 (2011);
Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 307, 310-11 (2006); Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, The Presidential
Signing Statements Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11, 13 (2007) (discussing
matters of degree with respect to signing statements). For the view that the President should
veto rather than sign with qualifications laws he thinks are unconstitutional, see Saikrishna
Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM. & MARY BILL. RTS. J.
81, 81 (2007); Michael B. Rappaport, The President’s Veto and the Constitution, 87 NW. U. L.
REV. 735, 736-37 (1993).
72. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Editorial, “Signing Statements” are a Phantom Target,
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2006, at A9.
73. See Presidential Signing Statements: Hoover-Obama, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/signingstatements.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (select first
year of desired presidency; then follow “Display” hyperlink; then add the number of results
displayed; aggregate results for each year of presidency for total number of signing
statements); see also Neil J. Kinkopf & Peter M. Shane, Signed Under Protest: A Database of
Presidential Signing Statements, 2001-2009 (Version 2.0) (Ohio State Pub. Law Working
Paper No. 141, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers/cfm?abstract_id=
1748474. 
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legislative changes. And they ignore the substance of signing
statements, and thus ignore the differences between the important
and the inconsequential. But they also ignore the effect of the
publicity and controversy about signing statements, much of which
started in 2006,74 and thus the figures for the last two years of the
George W. Bush administration and for the Obama administration
may be lower than they would have been absent the signing state-
ments controversy.75
Still, for all of the ambiguities about the data, they do suggest
that the very idea of a signing statement, or even using signing
statements with considerable frequency, has little political inci-
dence. The most important analysis, however is yet to be done, and
that is an analysis examining signing statements, OLC opinions,
and related indicia of presidential legal and constitutional opinions
(such as, for example, positions taken in Supreme Court litigation
by the Solicitor General, and positions taken in other litigation by
various executive departments) in order to determine the extent to
which administrations were willing to take legal positions contrary
to that administration’s own policy positions because of the per-
ceived dictates of the law or the Constitution. And even that anal-
ysis would need to take account of the base rate of agreement
between what the Constitution or the law required and what some
administration preferred. If, for example, the Constitution were to
be rewritten in 2017 by a Republican-dominated constitutional
convention, and then ratified by the requisite number of state
legislatures, and if a Democratic President were to be elected in
2020 to take office in January of 2021, we might expect to see a
greater degree of willingness to press against that Constitution by
that President than we would see with a President who found the
substance of the Constitution more congenial.
Thus, the question we should genuinely want to ask is about the
extent to which Presidents are willing to subjugate their own policy
views to the demands of the law or to the Constitution. We cannot
74. Robert Pear, Legal Group Says Bush Undermines Law by Ignoring Select Parts of
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2006, at A12.
75. For a recent update, and some confirmation of the view that the publicity surrounding
signing statements has made their use more difficult, see Todd Garvey, The Obama
Administration’s Evolving Approach to Signing Statements, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 393
(2011).
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answer this question, however, unless we can control for the
substance of the policy views, the substance of the law, and the
substance of the Constitution, as well as numerous other variables,
and doing so is a methodologically daunting prospect. Yet were we
able to do this, we could then—and only then—actually determine
the extent to which the willingness to comply with the law qua law,
or with the Constitution qua Constitution, or with Supreme Court
(or other judicial)76 holdings just because of their source and not
because of their content, was something that varied with Presidents
or varied with political party. At the very least, however, what we
do know may suggest that, when law is appropriately isolated as a
factor in presidential decisions, it may turn out that this factor
varies less with presidents and less with political alignment than is
commonly supposed in much of public and even academic commen-
tary.
VI
Although much of the previous section has been about the exec-
utive department, we can ask the same questions about legislative
bodies, and the answers may well produce similar conclusions.
Consider, for example, the conclusions reached by Ittai Bar-Siman-
Tov in a recent issue of this journal.77 In examining the extent to
which Congress was willing to violate its own internal rules of
procedure, and the extent to which presidents were willing to
acquiesce in those violations, Bar-Siman-Tov found such willingness
76. Consider, for example, the practice of nonacquiescence by administrative agencies—
the practice by which administrative agencies will refuse to acquiesce in, and thus change
their practices on account of, federal appellate court decisions. See Samuel Estreicher &
Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679,
681-83 (1989). Although the agencies that practice nonacquiescence—the Internal Revenue
Service, for example—have some degree of political and ideological independence from the
administrations in power, that independence is not total. As a result, it might be interesting
to examine whether the degree of nonacquiescence varied with administration or with
political party. Again, it would be ideal to control for the political makeup of the courts whose
judgments are the subjects of acquiescence or nonacquiescence. But even though that would
likely be an impossible task, we still might learn something from examining comparative
nonacquiescence strategies across time, place, administration, party, and agency.
77. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 871
(2010).
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and acquiescence surprisingly prevalent.78 But he also found,
drawing on the work of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein,79 that
“both parties have been increasingly guilty of deviations from
lawmaking rules and process abuses when they controlled Con-
gress.”80
The question of obedience to law, and more particularly the
question of departmentalism, also arises for Congress in the context
of congressional willingness (or not) to follow Supreme Court de-
cisions that would render unconstitutional various forms of publicly
appealing legislation. Several examples are most prominent. One is
Congress’s unhesitating willingness to pass by an overwhelming
majority a flag desecration statute almost immediately after the
Supreme Court’s decision Texas v. Johnson.81 Only by the most
tortured reasoning could that statute be thought distinguishable
from the state law invalidated in Johnson. Moreover, Congress
passed the new law so quickly after that case that the likelihood
of a different Supreme Court result because of a change on court
personnel, intervening precedents, or simple passage of time was
essentially nonexistent. And as virtually everyone, including the
members of Congress who voted for the bill, expected, the Supreme
Court promptly invalidated the law in United States v. Eichman,
although there is no indication that any of the members of Congress
who voted for a law sure to be found unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court suffered any political repercussions on account of
their votes.82
78. Id.
79. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS
FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 7-9, 100-06, 169-75, 212-16 (2008)
(discussing abuses by political parties).
80. Bar-Siman-Tov, supra note 77, at 849.
81. 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989); see 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1988).
82. 496 U.S. 310, 310 (1990). Indeed, insofar as official compliance with the law because
it is the law is surprisingly low, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, the highly likely
explanation is that officials, especially elected officials, respond to voter preferences. If
legality qua legality is not within the array of voter preferences, and there is scant indication
that it is, then there is little reason to suspect that it will be within the array of motivations
for the actions or votes of elected officials. There is a vast political science and political
economy literature on voter motivation and its effect on the behavior of political officials. See,
e.g., TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS?: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD GOVERNMENT
36-38 (2006); John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, 50 PUB. CHOICE
5, 5-9 (1986); James Snyder & Michael Ting, Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of
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Another example comes from the law invalidated in Dickerson v.
United States.83 The law was essentially a congressional overturning
of Miranda v. Arizona,84 and again was predictably overturned by
the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, hardly an
admirer of Miranda,85 writing for the 7-2 majority. And still another
example, not a surprising one given the limited political power of
the child pornographer lobby, comes from the persistent attempts
by Congress to press against Supreme Court decisions regarding the
unconstitutionality of restrictions on virtual child pornography.86
In all of these instances, the laws passed by Congress were ones
reacting against what might loosely be called “liberal” Supreme
Court opinions. Whether there are examples in reverse—in which
more or less liberal congressional majorities were willing to enact
laws appealing to their constituencies that were almost certain to
be invalidated by the Supreme Court—is far less clear. And if the
examples of congressional disregard of Supreme Court precedent
turned out to be less politically indiscriminate than other forms of
disregard for law or for judicial decisions, this might tell us some-
thing about Congress, or about law, or, most likely, about the kinds
of Supreme Court opinions that are most likely to enrage the pop-
ulation. 
VII
The examples and data I provide here are preliminary and
incomplete. And the hypothesis I suggest—that the inclination to
Politicians, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 482, 482 (2008); Matthew C. Stephenson & Jide O. Nzelibe,
Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes, 22 J. THEORETICAL POL. 139,
139 (2010). But none of this literature even comes close to suggesting that following the law
just because it is the law figures significantly in voter motivation, and thus in voter-
responsive official motivation.
83. 530 U.S. 428, 431-32 (2000).
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
85. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 539 (White,
J., dissenting)) (rejecting a rule that would “seriously imped[e] the task of law enforcement”).
86. See generally Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004); Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002). Also relevant is Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), in which the unanimous invalidation of a congressional
prohibition on “indecent” telephone conversations, with Justice White writing for the Court,
was a good indication of the ex ante likelihood at the time of passage that the law would be
upheld.
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disobey statutes, rules, regulations, and judicial opinions knows no
party and no political orientation—is less important, at least to me,
than the question it was designed to address. We exist in a political
and rhetorical world in which political opponents are with some
frequency accused of being unfaithful to the law, or unfaithful to the
rule of law. But if faithfulness to the law is to be understood as a
value to which political officials and public figures should aspire—
and it is hardly necessarily true that this be so87—we need to be able
to isolate for analytic purposes the idea of obeying the law just
because it is law. And once we have done that, we may discover that
the practice of following the law just because it is the law is less
common in public political decision making and policymaking than
is commonly supposed and is far less rewarded by the electorate and
in public political life than is commonly supposed. To the extent that
this is true, and thus to the extent that first-order questions of
moral and political and policy substance vastly outweigh second-
order questions of legality in public and political perception,88 then
87. It is important to bear in mind that many great moral tragedies—slavery, Nazism,
and apartheid in South Africa, to name just three—have involved obedience and not
disobedience to positive law. Sorting out the jurisprudence of these tragedies requires dealing
with the issues of legal philosophy that have justifiably put such events at the center of
disputes about just what law is, and about how, if at all, law connects with morality. Thus,
see, in the context of slavery and the Fugitive Slave Laws, ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); in the context of South Africa,
DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS: SOUTH AFRICAN LAW IN THE
PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2d ed. 2010); and in the context of Nazi Germany,
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS (1964); Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630-33
(1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593
(1958). And for such issues more generally, and more recently, see JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD,
LIMITS OF LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING 3-6 (2010); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V.
LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE 23 (1989); W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND
FIDELITY TO LAW ch. 1 (2010). So although we can identify obedience to law as a form of
human behavior, it takes further argument to establish that obedience to law is an
“unqualified human good.” See Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human
Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 561 (1977) (book review). 
88. This hypothesis is in some tension with the view that content-independent legitimacy,
especially procedural legitimacy, is a significant factor in determining legal compliance. See
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19-22 (2d ed. 2006); Tom R. Tyler,
Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens To Defer to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 996-97 (2000); Tom R. Tyler, Psychology and the Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 711, 711-19 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008). Almost
all of Tyler’s research, however, is in the context of ordinary citizen compliance with law when
such compliance is to the disadvantage of the complier. Little of it deals with compliance with
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we should not be surprised to discover that the disinclination to
value that which the public does not value exists across the political
spectrum. I suspect that not only is the value of legality in its own
right more rare than many commentators believe, but also that its
presence or absence is roughly equally distributed across political
party and across ideology. In this Article I have offered a few facts,
a few figures, and a few anecdotes that might support this hypo-
thesis, but testing it more systematically must wait for another
occasion.
laws that the putative complier believes are mistaken, and none of it deals with the question
of official compliance.
